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Much research has implied that social capital functions as an ???????????????????????????
enhancing governance, economic performance, and quality of life (Coleman 1988; Cohen and 
Arato 1992; Putnam 1993; Cohen and Rogers 1995).  Scholars of disaster (Nakagawa and Shaw 
2004; Adger et al. 2005; Dynes 2005; Tatsuki 2008) have extended this concept to posit that 
social capital provides nonexcludable benefits to whole communities after major crises.  Using 
qualitative methods to analyze data from villages in Tamil Nadu, India following the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami, this paper demonstrates that high levels of social capital simultaneously provided 
strong benefits and equally strong negative externalities, especially to those already on the 
periphery of society.  In these villages, high levels of social capital reduced barriers to collective 
action for members of the uur panchayats (hamlet councils) and parish councils, speeding up 
their recovery and connecting them to aid organizations, but at the same time reinforced 
obstacles to recovery for women, Dalits, migrants, and Muslims.  These localized findings have 
important implications for academic studies of social capital and policy formation for future 
disasters and recovery schemes. 
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 Not long after the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, observers noticed that 
similarly damaged villages on the southeast coast of India had very different patterns of recovery.  
One scholar described how, when relief workers arrived on the scene of a damaged village, 
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????-
governmental fisher caste councils, who handed over carefully prepared lists of their casualties, 
damage, and needs (Bavinck 2008: 76).  This self-organized, coordinated response to crisis stood 
was in stark contrast to the frustration and anger expressed by another hamlet nearby which felt 
left out of the aid framework. ???????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
response to his request to re-start the small business he lost in the tsunami. We also are frustrated 
that the government never replies to our requests to replace the tools and handcarts we need to go 
back to work. We also are considering suicide? (quoted in Gill 2007: 6).  What accounts for this 
variation in recovery? 
This article uses case studies of hamlets and villages1 in Tamil Nadu, India after the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami to investigate the effect of varying levels of social resources on post-
disaster outcomes.  Based on site visits, interviews with local residents and NGO leaders, and an 
analysis of secondary and tertiary materials, the article argues that villages with high levels of 
bonding and linking social capital received greater amounts of aid and assistance more quickly 
than communities which possessed only bonding capital.  However, while villages more tightly 
linked to outside organizations experienced better post-disaster recovery, minorities, outcastes, 
and nonmembers in those hamlets were often excluded from the assistance process.  That is, 
hamlets which overcame collective action problems and efficiently extracted resources from 
donors and government officials also left out tsunami-affected villagers on the social margins of 
society.  Through links to external agencies, coordinated villages with uur panchayat (hamlet or 
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fisher council) leadership were able to transmit their interests and needs, while at the same time 
pushing aside those residents on the periphery.  Based on the experiences of these villages in 
which governance institutions serving as connectors to outside agencies engaged in caste-based 
discrimination, future scholarship on disaster recovery must not overlook the negative 
externalities that can accompany strong social networks.  The negative externalities illuminated 
here include exclusion from organized relief efforts and discrimination against nonmembers in a 
variety of institutional settings. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????that social capital 
functions primarily or solely as a ?public good? (Coleman 1988; Cohen and Arato 1992; Putnam 
1993; Cohen and Rogers 1995), that is, a resource which provides nonexcludable benefits, so 
that all residents of a high social capital neighborhood enjoy its positive side effects.  More 
broadly, many researchers envision ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????studying 
disaster have applied this logic to argue that high levels of social capital speed up post-disaster 
recovery for communities affected by crisis (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Dynes 2005; Tatsuki 
2008).  In a widely cited article (Adger et al. 2005: 1038) the authors claim that social capital has 
???????????buffering the effects of extreme natural hazards and promoting social reorganization??? 
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????-????????????????(Szreter 2002) which brings both benefits and costs; social 
networks bring about different policy and governance outcomes for groups within the 
mainstream than those at the periphery.  This article focuses on collective outcomes for villages 
and hamlets, not individual recoveries; it is possible to find positive individual recoveries for 
residents even in low social capital areas and vice versa. 
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This article first describes the relevant literature on the role of social capital in recovery, 
lays out the context for the study, and identifies the data and methodology used in the analysis.  
It then investigates villages with varying levels of social capital to check their post-tsunami 
recovery levels, discusses the results of this analysis, and concludes with policy 
recommendations and suggestions for researchers based on these findings. 
 
L iterature Review: Social Capital in Disaster Recovery 
 Definitions for social capital ? introduced to social scientists by James Coleman (1988) 
and later popularized by Robert Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) ? vary, but for this study its core 
elements revolve around the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cooperation for mut????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
explanation comes from Lin (2008: 51) who defined social capital as ?resources embedded in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
network are assumed to carry out their obligations and obey norms) and expectations of 
reciprocity (if acts of kindness are to be repaid and if individuals are expected to free ride or not) 
(Coleman 1988).   Higher amounts of social capital allow groups to overcome the typical barriers 
to collective action which regularly stymie mobilization (Olson 1965).  For example, villages in 
India with higher levels of social capital and active leadership displayed better performance in 
the field of economic development, community peace, and democratic participation (Krishna 
2002), while regions in Italy with higher levels of social capital displayed more responsive 
governance and stronger economic growth (Putnam 1993).     
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 Research has identified three distinct forms of social capital: bonding, bridging, and 
linking.  Bonding social capital grows from organizations and activities connecting similar 
individuals who often live in close proximity to each other (cf. Schuller, Baron, and Field 2000).  
Putnam (2000: 22) sees bonding social capital as ???????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????This 
type of social connection often links individuals already very similar to each other in terms of 
race, ethnicity, or religion.  S?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
our informal networks for recreation and leisure are often quite similar to us.  Research on social 
ties has confirmed the long-held intuition that homogeneity brings with it higher levels of social 
capital, while ethnic diversity does the opposite (Leigh 2006).  One large-N study of 41 
communities across the United States showed that inter-racial trust and trust of neighbors was 
highest where ethnic homogeneity was highest; alternatively, higher levels of diversity brought 
about lower levels of engagement and social capital (Putnam 2007).  Another survey on 307 
???????????????????????????????????ities with a more heterogeneous population indeed have 
lower levels of soc??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
are most likely to have higher levels of civic participation, trust, and bonding social capital 
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). 
Bridging social capital???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????connecting individuals across typical cleavages.  
Bridging activities and organizations bring together individuals from different neighborhoods, 
ethnicities, and races (Schuller, Baron, and Field 2000).  Varshney (2001), for example, 
documented how inter-ethnic trade unions, political parties, sports clubs, and other organizations 
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brought together Hindus and Muslims in India and dampened social conflict between them.  
Parent-Teacher Associations in the United States bring together parents of various ethnic 
backgrounds and religions, as do public schools.  Where bonding social capital reinforced 
obvious affinities between residents, bridging social capital can connect diverse individuals. 
Szereter and Woolcock (2004: 655) discuss a third type ? linking social capital ? that is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e who are 
interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society.?  
Where bridging social capital connects individuals of more-or-less equal social status, linking 
social capital connects those of unequal status, providing them with access to power.  Linking 
social capital brings together citizens with decision makers and leaders who hold positions of 
authority and can distribute often scarce resources. For example, most villagers living in hamlets 
in southeast India never interact directly with government officials or NGO representatives 
(Interviews, February 2008).  After the tsunami, though, some caste councils developed direct 
connections to outside organizations, including independent aid agencies, international NGOs, 
and civil servants within the Indian government.  Both in India and abroad, disaster survivors 
able to access such non-local authority figures had measurably better recoveries than those 
without such extended networks (Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert 1996; Wetterberg 2005). 
More broadly, research has generally linked higher levels of social capital to better post-
crisis outcomes.  For example, an investigation of the role of village social ties in Indonesia 
???????????????????????????????????????????????certain types of social ties are indeed a sort of 
capital for the poor, who are able to use their relationships as a way of improving well-???????
(Wetterberg 2005: 1).  Nakagawa and Shaw (2004)  argued that localities with higher levels of 
social capital demonstrated better recovery following earthquakes in India and Japan.  Dynes 
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(2005) has suggested, based on experiences of survivors in a number of disasters, that social 
capital may be the basis for resilience (the ability to recover from trauma and crisis), as it 
provides information and resources at critical junctures.   Adger et al (2005: 1038) claim that 
?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? enhanced resilience??
in post-tsunami Indonesia.   Similarly, strong social ties among coastal dwellers in the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands enabled rapid in-group assistance to tsunami-???????????????????????????????
capital of the tuhets [joint family] is so strong that there is no need for any external aid agencies 
to assist orphaned children from any tribal community?????????????????????????????? 
 Neighborhoods and villages with wider and denser networks implement faster recoveries 
following a disaster for three reasons.  First, strong ???????????????????????????????????????????????
allowing victims to draw upon ready-made support networks for financial, physical, and logistic 
guidance (Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert 1996). Similarly, ?[a]ctors who have connections outside 
their immediate community are likely to be better off, as they can draw on these links when local 
resources are insufficient or unavailable??(Wetterberg 2005: 7).  More broadly, information and 
signals from civil society ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? are critical to decision-making processes of survivors, and cannot be replaced by 
government pronouncements (Chamlee-Wright and Rothschild 2007: 2).  Social networks thus 
provide essential information, support, and guidance through strong and weak ties (Granovetter 
1973).    
 Second, organized communities can better mobilize and overcome barriers to collective 
action (Olson 1965).  Neighbors with greater levels of trust share information about bureaucratic 
procedures and upcoming deadlines, monitor public space to prevent dumping, and deter looting 
in their community.  Following the 1995 Kobe earthquake, for example, local residents in some 
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neighborhoods organized to cooperative, fireproof housing while other areas waited for guidance 
from city officials (Olshansky, forthcoming).  As DeFilippis (2001) has argued, social capital can 
assist individuals in attracting and controlling resources, as better organized and mobilized 
regions can more successfully access the loans, supplies, and other resources (Dow 1999).   
 Finally, social ne??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
probability that resid??????????????????????  (Hirschman 1970).  Deeper social ties act as a barrier 
to exit ? one of the potential responses to a crisis - and make it more likely that residents who are 
embedded in the community will work for a solution.  Areas with softer voices - those plagued 
by weak community ties - will rebuild more slowly, if they rebuild at all (Kamel and Loukaitou-
Sideris 2004).  Citizens bound by fewer ties to their neighbors are more likely to engage in 
illegal and disruptive acts which can impede recovery efforts (Varshney 2001; Lee and 
Bartkowski 2004). 
However, scholars who envision social capital solely as a nonexcludable resource which 
provides positive benefits to all may have overlooked its accompanying externalities, including 
the ???????????????????????? (Wetterberg 2005: 4).  Some have seen the foundational work of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
social capital without fully acknowledging its costs (Berman 1997; Chambers and Kopstein 
2001).  Strong bonds between members of an in-group, for example, may reinforce hatred and 
xenophobia and facilitate destructive action so that denser social capital contributes to criminal 
activity directed at outsiders (Nagar and Rethemeyer 2007). Further, during post-Katrina 
recovery in New Orleans, Louisiana, neighborhoods with higher levels of bonding social capital 
mobilized to block recovery plans ? a tactic which they believed benefited their blocks but which 
slowed the process of recovery as a whole (Aldrich and Crook 2008).  This article builds on the 
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observation that strong social capital can bring ???????????????????????????????????????????????
in-group participants gain more resilience to shocks and better coordinate their recovery efforts 
but out-group residents find themselves further on the periphery. 
Given that social capital does not manifest itself in the same form across time and 
societies, its measurement must be sensitive to the historical period and cultural environment 
under investigation (Krishna 2007: 944-945).  Serra (2001) argued that standard Western 
measures of social capital, such as those used by Putnam in his 1993 study of northern and 
southern Italy - including literacy, voter turnout, and membership in horizontal associations ? did 




resources.  This article focuses on local caste or hamlet councils (known as uur panchayats in 
Tamil) as a critical, institutionalized source of social capital on the southeast Indian coast.  Uur 
panchayats are distinct from the formal gram panchayats, which are the lowest tier of the 
subnational governance bodies established by the government.  Where gram panchayats serve as 
the locus for local government in small villages and towns throughout India and exist at the 
village, block, and district levels, uur panchayats are hamlet-level councils structured by caste 
and occupation most commonly found in fishing villages (Bavinck 2001, 2008).  These 
nongovernmental organizations reinforce existing caste- and occupation-ties. 
Villages in post-tsunami Tamil Nadu which were governed by caste councils regularly 
held higher levels of both bonding and linking social capital, while unorganized hamlets may 
have had similar levels of bonding social capital but displayed far lower levels of linking 
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connections.  These uur panchayats reinforced existing ties between same-caste members and 
governed villages from a gendered, caste perspective, often excluding women, outcastes, and 
minorities from participation and distribution.  Table 1 below lays out examples of the 
interactions between these two types of social resources based on the cases discussed throughout 
the article. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 Two core mechanisms, then, could increase the success of recovery efforts post-disaster.  
First, deep reservoirs of bonding social capital create tightly knit support networks and the ability 
to overcome collective problems.  Such connections ? which can bring information and local 
assistance - are most likely in localities with long term residents and caste homogeneity, such as 
Dalit villages and uur panchayat-led ones.  The second mechanism involves translocal 
connections to NGOs and government agencies; such links help survivors and villages more 
quickly and easily acquire often scarce resources post-crisis from beyond their typical reach.  In 
the handful of villages under study here, hamlets led by uur panchayats benefited from both 
mechanisms after the tsunami, but minorities, women, and other peripheral groups in those towns 
often lost out during the aid distribution process because of their lack of translocal connections.  
Dalit villages and other localities without links to the outside world had only bonding social 
capital to assist them in their recovery process, while mixed-caste coastal villages lacked both 
bonding and linking social capital. 
 
Context for the Study 
 Two massive underwater earthquakes off the coast of Sumatra on the morning of 26 
December 2004 ? measured at 9.0 and 7.3 respectively - generated tsunami waves which reached 
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as far as Africa (Arya, Mandal, and Muley 2006: 52).  The enormous waves crashed down on 
coastal villages in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, and Myanmar (Sheth, Sanyal, Jaiswal, 
and Gandhi 2006: S439).  Speaking about his experience in Sri Lanka, Dayalan Sanders 
???????????a massive 30 foot wall of sea?it was like a thousand freight trains charging at you, 
that thunderous roar ????????????????????????????????(quoted in Bindra 2005: 29).  Across Asia, 
more than 200,000 people lost their lives.  In southeast India, the 13 coastal districts in the state 
of Tamil Nadu  suffered the worst effects, with approximately 8,000 people killed by the waves 
(REDS 2006: 13).  6,000 residents were killed in the district of Nagapattinam and 817 and 606 
died in Kanyakumari and Cuddalore districts, respectively (Arya, Mandal, and Muley 2006: 53; 
UN Team for Recovery Support 2005: 3).   
 As in past disasters, the tsunami affected vulnerable demographic groups most severely, 
with women and children comprising most of the casualties (United Nations Team for Tsunami 
Recovery Support 2007: 9).  Fishing communities sustained the largest losses of lives and 
property loss due to their location on the coast (Alexander 2006: 8).  Surveys showed that more 
than 60 percent of families in the area perceived they had lost a quarter or more of their income, 
while one in five families reported that they lost between three-quarters and all of it (Fritz 
Institute 2005: 4).  The roughly 2000 kilometers of coastal area in southeast India accounted for 
85 percent of the damage (Salagrama 2006b: 5) as more than half of these villages sit within 200 
meters of the shore (Rodriguez, Balasubramanian, Shiny, Duraiswamy and Jaiprakash 2008: 18).  
Along with coastal roads, bridges, and ports, more than 150,000 homes were demolished by the 
force of the waves (United Nations, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank 2006:  8) with 
$1.3 billion in property and asset losses. The tsunami destroyed or damaged 80,000 fishing boats, 
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killed 32,000 livestock animals, and damaged and salinated close to 40,000 hectares of 
agricultural land (OSGSETR 2005: 7).   
The government of India acted as quickly as possible to both resettle survivors and 
provide them with adequate food, shelter, and medical treatment.  Rushed evacuation procedures 
resulted in the random placement of many survivors in temporary shelters and villages where 
they had few, if any connections (see Aldrich forthcoming).  In interviews, survivors described 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????people were placed with 
people of different communities??(Case 7, Tata Institute 2007).   ??????????????????????????????y 
old neighbors are not nearby, they are in the locality but far from my house.  It was a lottery to 
choose locations for houses??????????????20 February 2008). This disaster recovery policy brings 
with it important implications for social networks; I will return to discuss this issue at the end of 
the article. 
 Damage across the southeast coast of India varied by geography ? villages and hamlets in 
alluvial delta regions, such as Akkaraipettai in Tamil Nadu, exper?????????????????????
????????  and were often wiped out (Sheth, Sanyal, Jaiswal, and Gandhi 2006: S440) while areas 
further inland or protected by sand dunes often escaped unscathed.  Some coastal Indian villages 
received telephone calls from relatives in cities warning them of the impending wave, but could 
not always able to act upon it in time (Case 7 and Case 12, Tata Institute 2007).  Beyond 
escaping harm, certain communities in the Tamil Nadu area affected by the waves have 
recovered more quickly than others with similar levels of damage (Author site visits, February 
2008).  More specifically, some villages brought in large amounts of financial assistance, NGO 
donations, new housing stock, and attention, while others seemed left out of the recovery process.   
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In a survey of 63 villages affected by the tsunami, Dalit, outcaste, and nonmember 
victims in 16 percent of the villages ? a group of roughly 7800 people - were eligible for relief 
but did not receive it in part or at all due to discrimination by gatekeepers (data from Louis 2005: 
2, 6-7).  Other reports claim that residents in more than 80 percent of villages, Dalits and other 
groups encountered discrimination in compensation procedures (Gill 2007: 30).   In some 
villages Dalit families were forced out of communal temporary shelters and their children were 
made to eat in separate locations from the other students (Gill 2007: 12).  In one case, an elderly 
Dalit woman lost her husband to the tsunami but received nothing due to the gate keeping 
measures of the local panchayat.  When two Dalit families in her village sought to stand in line 
to receive assistance, they were beaten and driven away (Case 43, Tata Institute 2007).   
 In another village, an NGO sought to provide a young widow with a new house post-
tsunami, but she was told by council leaders that ????????????????????????????????????????????
will not be given a house then she has t????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????(Case 
Study 2, Tata Institute 2007).  In a different case where the tsunami had killed both parents in a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????no attempt was made to collect information 
on their circumstances for ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
primary caregiver (Help Age International 2005: 7).  Widows and women in marginal economic 




????????? (Dorairaj  2005).  Migrants too faced difficulties in being listed for assistance or 
14 
  
receiving aid through the uur panchayats.  Because the council saw them as non members, ??????
281 families out of 420 have been enumerated for post-tsunami relief??(Gomathy 2006c:  233). 
 Parish priests and councils, like their uur panchayat counterparts, worked as 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????nformation from the parish priest and 
panchayat, not ???????????????????????????????by relief organizations (Case 7, Tata Institute 
2007).  In areas like Kanyakumari, residents complained that only families active in Catholic 
???????????????????benefited from the economic, social and educational opportunities made 
????????????REDS 2006: 29).   In another village, families which did not engage in Church-
sanctioned educational procedures found themselves excluded from the aid process.  When local 
families chose not to send their children to the ????????????????-run schools, those 16 families 
?facing the boycott were deprived of the NGO larg?????????????????????????????????
(Newindpress.com, 1 May 2006).   What systematic role institutions like the uur panchayat and 
parish councils played in the process of recovery is a critical question to which the article now 
turns. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 This article uses data gathered from site visits by the author to affected communities in 
Tamil Nadu, India, observations of post-tsunami recovery levels, interviews with survivors and 
NGOs, and extensive secondary and tertiary materials (including evaluations of the recovery 
carried out by local social service providers, grey materials from NGOs and government 
agencies which provided post-tsunami services, and local newspaper and wire service accounts 
of the recovery, translated from Hindi and Tamil when necessary).  In early 2008 I visited five 
villages (and two cities2) in southeast India affected by the tsunami and interviewed 27 survivors, 
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NGO leaders, activists, and disaster scholars with the assistance of a translator using open-ended 
questions about their experiences; I used secondary and tertiary materials (as detailed above) to 
study the sixth village.  I provide details on the gender, position, and location of these informants 
in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Roughly one-third of my informants were women, and four-fifths were local residents; our 
discussions lasted between 30 and 45 minutes each, on average.  Additionally, I was provided 
access to 80 anonymized cases of hour-or-longer interviews with local survivors collected by 
Indian social service agencies after the tsunami.  These transcribed interviews provided 
additional information about the day-to-day recovery process and broadened my understanding 
of the role of social resources in rehabilitation. 
I deliberately selected these six villages because of the variation in both levels of social 
capital and recovery through a selection process known as choice-based sampling method (see 
King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, sec. 4.4.2).  I chose these villages after consultation with local 
NGO and relief agency leaders working in the area who provided their expert insights into the 
range of outcomes and village characteristics.  Table 3 below describes basic characteristics of 
the six villages under direct study here; communities with a higher percentage of their families in 
new or repaired housing, whose survivors self-reported positive recoveries, and which were 
labeled by local agencies as doing well were categorized as ??????????????????????????????????
Alternatively, those communities with greater numbers of survivors who remained in temporary 
shelters, a smaller percentage of their community in rebuilt or new housing, more self-reports of 
obstacles to recovery, and which were seen by experts as not recovering well were categorized as 
??????????????????????.  These six villages do not serve as a sample of the entire universe of 
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cases; rather, case studies of their recoveries can help develop and probe new hypotheses about 
the relationships between social capital and post-disaster recovery. 
[Table 3 about here] 
These six villages are located in the state of Tamil Nadu (India has 28 states) and within the 
district of Nagapattinam (Tamil Nadu is divided into 32 districts), located on the southeast coast 
of India.  Tamil Nadu has grown more slowly than most other Indian states over the past decade 
but has displayed higher than average levels of population density and urbanization.  Its overall 
literacy rates climbed from two-thirds in 1991 to almost three-quarters by 2001 and it has been a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????-????????????in which government services 
can be access through the internet (REDS 2006: 30).  For the district of Nagapattinam, 
population density (based on the 2001 census, which is the most recent available data) was 520 
people per square kilometer in rural areas, 700 people per square kilometers in fishing hamlets, 
and 1720 people per square kilometer in rural ones.  
This article employs qualitative methodology to make replicable inferences (King, 
Keohane, Verba 1994) about the relationship between social capital and the levels of post-
disaster recovery. I use side-by-side case studies to tease out underlying causal mechanisms 
(George and Bennett 2004).  Process tracing ? like its quantitative counterparts ? relies on 
within-and across-case covariational evidence (Gerring 2004) to better illuminate the role of 
relevant factors.  A solid research design requires variation in both independent and dependent 
variables, and the villages under study had both varying levels of social capital (as indicated by 
the presence or absence of an uur panchayat) and recovery outcomes (determined by quality of 
housing and self- and external-reports on the recovery process). 
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Case Studies of V illages with Strong Bonding and L inking Social Capital 
 In hamlets 1, 3, 4, and 5 parish councils and uur panchayats (caste councils) dominate the 
social order, as they do in many other fishing villages in coastal Tamil Nadu (Gill 2007: 22).  
These non-state organizations connect same-caste residents in one industry ? Catholics who 
work in sea-related industries for parish councils in the south and Pattinvars3 who are fishers for 
uur panchayats in the southeast ? to each other, reinforcing existing bonding social capital in 
these localities.  Many coastal villages in Tamil Nadu are highly homogeneous, with Pattinavar 
fishing families making up 90 percent of the population and the remainder of the families 
coming from Dalits4 and various other castes (Bavinck 2008: 79; Sharma 2005: 4).  Ties between 
members of the fishing communities are strengthened due to shared caste and kinship groupings; 
????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????can be severely punished with 
ostracism by the community????????????006c: 218).   
 Parish councils and uur panchayats serve both as informal law and norm enforcers and as 
common pool resources (CPR) managers (Ostrom 1990; Salagrama 2006: 76; Bavinck 2008: 81).  
These councils maintain gramakattupadu (discipline in the village) (Gomathy 2006b) through 
dispute resolution and the managing of religious events.  In the past, councils engaged in hard 
and soft social control mechanisms (Aldrich 2008) through social pressure, fines, and ostracism 
(known as mariyal), but presently ?many of the villages restrict themselves to fining? (Gomathy 
2006c:  221).  More broadly, a council ?maintains community structure, rituals, village 
membership, resource ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Rodriguez, 
Balasubramanian, Shiny, Duraiswamy and Jaiprakash 2008: 11; see also Gomathy 2006c: 219).  
The distribution of shared supplies to members during the rainy season when fishing catches 
typically ran low (Bavinck 2008: 82) provides a typical example of their coordinated collective 
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action.  These councils which initially reified ??????????social capital (that is, assisting in-group 
members) came to serve more as ?links??with outside agencies after the tsunami.  Before the 
tsunami, fishing communities were said to lack connections to ?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? ? that is, many had small amounts of linking social capital - but 
the disaster brought them new roles as bridges to external aid organizations and the government. 
The 2004 tsunami transformed these institutions into critical gatekeepers for aid 
distribution, as the government of India relied heavily on these councils during the relief period.  
Government and NGO decision makers saw local councils as ?the only institution that can 
provide continuity, growth and indeed sustenance to the process of redevelopment initiated in the 
????????? (South Asia Regional Knowledge Platform 2005: 7).  Neither the government of India 
nor the NGOs involved in recovery could survey or interview every villager about his or her 
needs?????????????????????lists prepared by fisher panchayat [that is, uur panchayat] ?????????
(REDS 2006: 15) to appraise damage levels.  ???? ???????????[uur panchayats] acted as a one-
stop shop for the rehabilitation agencies (both Government and NGOs) to channel support into 
???????????????? (ICSF 2006: 206).  Thus villages 1, 3, 4, and 5 held stronger levels of linking 
social capital than hamlets without these governing bodies, and these ties provided survivors 
with connections to NGOs and the government post-tsunami. 
Once the hamlet and parish councils assessed the destruction and provided this 
information to the government of India and to NGOs, they stored all of the incoming aid. Rather 
than disbursing supplies as they came in, many uur panchayats sought to create an equitable 
distribution system for their recognized members (Author interviews, 2008; Gomathy 2006).  ?If 
the organization could dispense enough relief to all the members, distribution followed. 
Otherwise they were asked to deposit the materials till more were collected, in order that they 
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could be distributed to all members of the community.??????????????????????????For example, in 
one village the ?????????collect[ed] all boats that are given by the NGOs as well. These boats 
[we]re then sold to those who can buy them, with the rest of the money being distributed among 
other community member???????????????????????????????  Individuals or families within the village 
refusing to conform to these procedures found themselves facing social control mechanisms. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
relief they received from various service organizations,? were excommunicated by the uur 
panchayat? (Bavinck 2008: 88).   
While the strong social ties embedded in these organizations allowed them to overcome 
collective action problems and speed up the recovery of their members, those ties also made it 
difficult ? if not impossible ? for groups such as Dalit, women, and the elderly to receive aid or 
participate in the process.  Because the uur panchayats and parish councils created the lists of 
families requiring assistance, they could easily exclude ? deliberately or because of unintentional 
oversight ? nonmember families considered unw????????????????????????????????identified all 
beneficiaries but in some cases they excluded those in conflict with the panchayat along with 
????????????????????? 7, 21 February 2008).  Women ? especially women who headed 
households - and Dalit had never been formal members of uur panchayats before the disaster 
(Gomathy 2006c:  224; see also Sharma 2005: 4; Martin 2005: 44) and the process of recovery 
highlighted cultural barriers for them and other subgroups, including tribal communities 
(adivasi), single or widowed women, and the elderly (United Nations, World Bank, and Asian 





These villages ? 1, 3, 4, and 5 ? would inhabit the bottom, right-hand box in Table 1, holding 
high levels of both bonding and linking social capital.  While their overall recoveries were rated 
as ?good, ?minorities within these villages reported the greatest amount of discrimination and 
exclusion from the recovery process.  I now turn to investigate villages which lacked 
institutionalized bonding and linking capital to investigate their post-tsunami recovery. 
 
Case Studies of V illages with Low Levels of Bonding and L inking Social Capital  
While villages 2 and 6 lacked uur panchayat or parish councils and had poorer recovery 
outcomes in terms of housing and aid receipt, they also had almost no recorded cases of 
exclusion or discrimination (Interviews with residents, February 2008).  In such communities, 
?[e]xistence depends on the ingenuity of women, mutual support within extended families, and 
minimal income derived f?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????y, 
Kumaran, and Suresh 2005: 3).  Residents which lack a governing caste council must rely solely 
on existing, often kin-based bonding social capital during the post-crisis period, as they lack 
linking capital which could connect them to NGOs or government representatives.  As many 
scholars of social networks have pointed out, for underdeveloped regions and for individuals of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
connections to extra-local organizations they ?????????????????????????????????see Woolcock and 
Narayan 2000 for an extended discussion).  
These isolated villages did not connect to the government of India or to local or 
international nongovernmental organizations in the post-tsunami recovery process.  One village ? 
which I have labeled as Village 6 ? lacked a caste council and was unable to collectively 
mobilize and extract resources from the outside agencies after the tsunami.  Lacking communal 
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leadership and contacts with the broader relief world, the village was left out of the rehabilitation 
process.  Unlike other communities which could engage in collective action, ?[n]o communal 
strategies were employed? in ?propagating an image of a wreck?????????????????????????????????
?????no efforts were made to contact any outside aid ????????????????????????????????(Mercks 
2007:  39-40).  Instead, residents in village 6 were forced to rely on family members for 
assistance and literally were not on the maps of relief providers; a local NGO eventually came on 
the scene and tried to assist them (long after the recovery had started for other hamlets).   This is 
in strong contrast to the successful ability of hamlets (described above)  which self-organized to 
bring in external assistance. 
 Village 2 ? which, like its caste-council-governed counterparts, suffered heavy damage 
from the tsunami ? also lacked an organizing caste or parish council before the disaster.  
Attempts to interface with outsiders both domestic and international floundered and survivors 
could rely only on kinship ties and bonding social capital to find assistance.  Its process of 
recovery, then, did not favor one caste group, gender, or demographic over the other, but it also 
lacked the resources flowing into better-connected communities.  Some of the residents 
recognized that their recovery had been compromised due to a lack of connections and social 
capital.  As one survivor in the village ????? ???????????[now] planning to make a pan?????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Interview 11, 19 February 2008).  These two villages ? Village 2 and Village 6 - would sit in the 
upper, right-hand box of Table 1; their caste homogeneity and strong support networks involve a 
great deal of bonding social capital, but they lacked connections to extra-local agencies. 
Finally, one scholar described poorer post-tsunami outcomes for heterogeneous fishing 
communities in Tamil Nadu? hamlets which lacked both bonding and linking social capital.  
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Without coordinating mechanisms such as parish or hamlet councils, ??????????????? their 
coming together for collective and effecti????????????????????????????????(Salagrama 2006: 60).  
Such villages ? lacking both bonding and linking social capital ? would reside in the upper, left-
hand box of Table 1.  For residents and survivors of these villages, while everyone has received 
the same treatment and discrimination has been absent, recovery has been slower and impeded 
by a lack of external connections and resources. 
 
Presentation of F indings 
 
As past studies have argued, higher levels of social capital in tsunami-affected villages in 
Tamil Nadu provided resources for a faster and more efficient recovery (Nakagawa and Shaw 
2004; Dynes 2005; Adger et al. 2005; Tatsuki 2008).  However, these past studies have 
overlooked a critical point: whereas institutionalized bodies of strong bonding and linking social 
capital ? such as uur panchayats ? sped up the recovery for their members, they simultaneously 
slowed it down for outsiders and those on the margins of society.  Strong social capital brought 
with it a number of benefits, including more robust mental health outcomes and greater access to 
logistical and financial resources for survivors.  The strong local institutions of caste and parish 
councils served as focal points and mediators with the aid community during the relief efforts, 
ensuring that in-group members received aid.  Social capital reduced the need for counseling and 
external intervention post disaster (Gupta and Sharma 2006: 74) and social support systems - 
such as extended and joint families- ?contribute[d] ??????????????????????????????????????2007).  
Further, the weak ties (Granovetter 1973) which extended outside affected communities provided 
up to one-third of the financial assistance delivered to tsunami-affected households (Nidhiprabha 
2007: 26).  Scholars must now begin to recognize that ? at least in the case of Tamil Nadu 
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villages after the tsunami - these benefits come with exclusion of outsiders, such as widows, 
Dalit, Muslims, the elderly, non-Christians and migrants.  Especially in societies where racism, 
caste discrimination, and other forms of social persecution persist, such governance institutions 
may bring negative externalities.  This ???????-?????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????-disaster situations must be recognized in 
future scholarship. 
Finally, in terms of potential methodological pitfalls of the current article, while the 
sample size of villages in this study has been quite small, and these hamlets do not constitute a 
random or representative sample, the findings from these hamlets have been corroborated by 
larger studies of Tamil Nadu hamlets (Louis 2005).  That is, scholars have uncovered similar 
relationships between strong social capital and negative outcomes in other studies of post-crisis 
recovery in southeast India (Gill 2007).  Recent scholarship on post-Hurricane Katrina recovery 
in New Orleans has similarly shown that communities with both local bonding and extra-local 
bridging/linking social capital demonstrated more resilience than those neighborhoods solely 
with bonding ties (Elliott, Haney, Sams-Abiodun 2010).  
 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 Villages and hamlets in Nagapattinam with both bonding and linking social networks 
fared better than those solely with bonding connections (cf. Woolcock and Narayan 2000), but 
such localities practiced discrimination with some regularity.  Whether in pre-Nazi Germany 
(Berman 1997), early 21st century Thailand (Callahan 2005), or post-Katrina New Orleans 
(Aldrich and Crook 2008), strong social capital has often been accompanied by costs, especially 
for out-group residents and nonmembers.  Future research should seek to investigate the 
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externalities of social capital in post-disaster situations in multiple contexts and time periods.   
Given the regularity of disasters, and predictions that their destruction of lives and property will 
only continue to grow (Hoyois, Below, Scheuren, and Guha-Sapir 2007), disaster research 
remains a critical focus for social science.  C. Wright Mills (1959) pointed out that social science 
provides individuals with mastery over an increasingly complex world, and a better 
understanding of the recovery process would provide survivors and policy makers alike with 
???????????????????-  knowledge that is both accurate and politically tractable  (Haas 2004: 572).  
With the ubiquity of disasters and the certainty that coastal communities around the world will 
be experiencing the consequences of global warming in the near future, as scholars we have an 
obligation to better understand the factors which can expedite or block efficient and equitable 
recovery.  
Despite the dawning recognition of the importance of social capital in mitigating the 
effect of disasters (Hutton 2001; Mathbor 2007), standard post-disaster aid procedures continue 
to focus primarily on restoring physical infrastructure damaged by the disaster.  For example, 
when discussing the grants and loans provided to Indian coastal communities, the United Nations, 
World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (2006: 26) argued that ?????????????????????????????
roads and bridges serve as links not only for launching rescue and transporting for relief and 
rehabilitation, but also as escape routes. Therefore, the criticality of roads and bridges is 
indisputable.?  As an afterthought, these organizations acknowledged that community level 
social workers should encourage victims to participate in community events (2006:  34) to help 
them rebuild their social networks.  Social, not physical, infrastructure should be a mainstay in 
disaster mitigation and recovery policies. 
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Next, this article has sought to correct a naïve conception of social infrastructure in which 
social capital enhances resilience without bringing harm (cf. Adger et al 2005).  Observers 
envisioned the high cohesion within South Asian fishing communities as a symbol of ?strong 
sense of camaraderie and community membership among the individuals residing in the same 
area?????????????????altruistic behavior??(Rodriguez, Wachtendorf, Kendra, and Trainor 2006: 
173).  However, Wetterberg pointed out that (?????????????????????????? ??????????ught of as a 
potential source of benefits, rather than the benefits themselves,? and this article would further 
amend our understanding so that social capital needs to be seen as potential source of both 
benefits and costs.   
 Finally, policy makers should first ensure that recovery and rehabilitation plans do not 
destroy existing social capital through resettlement processes.  As mentioned earlier, post-
tsunami evacuation regularly placed survivors far from their family, friends, and social networks.  
If possible, disaster planners should evacuate people in socially intact groups or at least 
reassemble evacuees in intact communities.  Local residents themselves recognized the benefits 
of maintaining and strengthening networks after the tsunami.  In one study, an older woman 
??????????????????any people in this camp are from the same street and village in which I live and 
we all help each other? (Help Age International 2005: 12).  Some self-organized in their 
????????????????????????ost tsunami, all the members of one village decided to stay together in the 
temporary sheds in a gesture of unity, especially to support people who have lost their dear ones? 
(Gomathy 2006c: 218)???????????????????????????????????????????????????omen who are able to 
access familiar religious sites, markets, hospitals, relatives, friends and other resources will be 




 A second goal for disaster planners should be to consider how to expand both bonding 
and linking social capital so as include excluded groups and develop outreach skills for these 
peripheral residents at the same time (Elliott, Haney, Abiodun 2010).  Initial signs indicate that 
this may be happening.  The Mumbai-based Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) has 
developed a leadership seminar to increase the mobilization capacity of indigenous groups and 
tribal peoples in India to better connect with outside communities.  Through such programs 
otherwise insular groups may develop new linking social capital which puts them in touch with 
new resources and organizations.  Local NGOs, such as the National Council of YMCAs of India, 
has begun providing training to women to expand livelihood options including matt weaving and 
diamond polishing (Site Visit, 19 February 2008).  These new skill sets and new government 
regulations requiring the names of both husband and wife on land titles will provide women 
additional leverage to push for broader participation both in political and economic spheres.  
Public policy should ensure that wherever possible, societies work to build up the bonding and 
linking social networks of vulnerable communities to ensure that they will be better positioned 
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Table 1:  Interaction between Bonding and Linking Social Capital, with Examples 
 Low Bonding Social Capital High Bonding Social Capital 
Low Linking Social Capital 
Heterogeneous coastal 
villages without uur 
panchayats 
Homogeneous Dalit villages 





Table 2: Details on Informants 
Interview  
Number   Gender   Position   Location  
1   Male   Resident   Village  1  
2   Female   Widowed  survivor   Village  1  
3   Male   Resident   Village  1  
4   Male   Local  activist   City  1  
5   Male   Resident   Village  2  
6   Female   Resident   Village  2  
7   Female   NGO  Leader   City  1  
8   Female   Resident   Village  2  
9   Female   Resident   Village  3  
10   Male   NGO  Leader   City  1  
11   Male   Resident   Village  2  
12   Male   NGO  Leader   City  1  
13   Female   Widowed  resident   Village  3  
14   Female   Resident   Village  2  
15   Female   Wife  of  village  head   Village  5  
16   Male   Disaster  scholar   City  2  
17   Male   Local  activist   Village  4  
18   Male   Resident   Village  4  
19   Male   Local  activist   City  1  
20   Male   Resident   Village  1  
21   Male   Disaster  scholar   City  2  
22   Female   Resident   Village  1  
23   Male   Fisher   Village  1  
24   Male   Scholar   City  1  
25   Male   Resident   Village  1  
26   Male   Resident   Village  1  




Table 3: Summary of Village Characteristics 
Village  Designation   Hamlet  /  parish  council   Level  of  damage   Recovery  Outcome  
1   Yes   High   Good  
2   No   High   Poor  
3   Yes   Moderate   Good  
4   Yes   High   Good  
5   Yes   Moderate   Good  
6   No   High   Poor  
  
 
                                                                                                                    
1 I use the words hamlet and village interchangeably through the article.  Typical villages in Tamil Nadu hold 
between 200 and 1200 people (Bavinck 2001); hamlets of this size are classified by the government of India census 
as Class VI villages. 
2 I traveled to the urban areas to meet with several NGO leaders and scholars who worked with tsunami-affected 
residents in villages in rural Tamil Nadu but had offices in nearby cities; these cities themselves are not the focus of 
the study. 
3  Communities where fishing is the core livelihood will elevate the caste of that demographic above other  normally 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
same village might have representatives of the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
communication 7/29/09).  See also Srinivas (1987) for a full discussion of this phenemenon. 
4 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????tand outside the 
standard four-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
physically unclean, and in the caste system must live in a separate colony, must use separate water and eating 
facilities, must never come in contact with caste Hindus, must call out an identifying greeting to ensure everyone 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
included removing carcasses of dead animals, working with leather, performing midwifery duties, cleaning toilets, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
jati (caste) in historical and social context.  
